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Causal inference with two versions of treatment
Raiden B. Hasegawa, Sameer K. Deshpande, Dylan S. Small and Paul R. Rosenbaum1
Abstract. Causal effects are commonly defined as comparisons of the potential outcomes
under treatment and control, but this definition is threatened by the possibility that either the
treatment or the control condition is not well-defined, existing instead in more than one version.
This is often a real possibility in nonexperimental or observational studies of treatments, because
these treatments occur in the natural or social world without the laboratory control needed to
ensure identically the same treatment or control condition occurs in every instance. We consider
the simplest case: either the treatment condition or the control condition exists in two versions
that are easily recognized in the data but are of uncertain, perhaps doubtful, relevance, e.g.,
branded Advil vs. generic ibuprofen. Common practice does not address versions of treatment:
typically the issue is either ignored or explicitly stated but assumed to be absent. Common
practice is reluctant to address two versions of treatment because the obvious solution entails
dividing the data into two parts with two analyses, thereby (i) reducing power to detect versions
of treatment in each part, (ii) creating problems of multiple inference in coordinating the two
analyses, (iii) failing to report a single primary analysis that uses everyone. We propose and
illustrate a new method of analysis that begins with a single primary analysis of everyone
that would be correct if the two versions do not differ, adds a second analysis that would
be correct were there two different effects for the two versions, controls the family-wise error
rate in all assertions made by the several analyses, and yet pays no price in power to detect a
constant treatment effect in the primary analysis of everyone. Our method can be applied to
analyses of constant additive treatment effects on continuous outcomes. Unlike conventional
simultaneous inferences, the new method is coordinating several analyses that are valid under
1Raiden Hasegawa and Sameer K. Deshpande are PhD students and Dylan Small and Paul Rosenbaum
are professors in the Department of Statistics, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia,
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different assumptions, so that one analysis would never be performed if one knew for certain
that the assumptions of the other analysis are true. It is a multiple assumptions problem,
rather than a multiple hypotheses problem. We discuss the relative merits of the method with
respect to more conventional approaches to analyzing multiple comparisons. The method is
motivated and illustrated using a study of the possibility that repeated head trauma in high
school football causes an increase in risk of early on-set cognitive decline.
Keywords: Causal effects, closed testing, full matching, intersection-union test, randomization
inference, sensitivity analysis, versions of treatment.
1 What are versions of treatment?
Commonly, the effect on an individual caused by a treatment is defined as a comparison of
the two potential outcomes that this individual would exhibit under treatment and under
control; see Neyman (1923), Welch (1937) and Rubin (1974). Implicit in this definition is
the notion that the treatment and control conditions are each well-defined. In particular,
it is common to assume that there are “no versions of treatment or control”; see Rubin
(1986).
By definition, versions of treatment are not intended additions to a study design, but
rather potential flaws in the study design. Versions of treatment or control are often associ-
ated with finding treatments that occur naturally, rather than experimentally manipulating
a tightly controlled, uniform treatment. Versions of one treatment should be distinguished
from the intentional study of distinct, competing treatments. When an investigator dis-
cusses versions of one treatment, she is expressing a preference for the conception that there
is a single treatment, but is acknowledging the possibility that her preferred conception is
mistaken. Branded Advil and generic ibuprofen are versions of one treatment — possibly
different, but very plausibly expected to be the same — whereas ibuprofen and aspirin
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are different competing treatments. The investigator and her audience prefer a primary
analysis that does not distinguish versions of treatment, but both would be reassured by
evidence that showed their preferred analysis does not embody a consequential error. Ver-
sions of control groups should also be distinguished from the deliberate use of two carefully
selected control groups intended to reveal unmeasured biases if present; see, for instance,
Rosenbaum (1987). In particular, Campbell (1969) suggested that two control groups
should be deliberately selected to systematically vary a specific unmeasured covariate in
an effort to demonstrate its irrelevance; however, versions of control are unintended flaws
in study design, not purposeful quasi-experimental devices.
There are two versions of either the treatment condition or the control condition if we
recognize in available data either two types of treated subjects or two types of controls, but
we are uncertain about, or perhaps explicitly doubt, the relevance of this visible distinc-
tion. Versions refer to a visible but perhaps unimportant distinction, not to a distinction
that is hidden or latent. There are important methodological issues in recognizing treat-
ments that inexplicably affect some people but not others; however, this is practically and
mathematically a different problem (Conover and Salsberg 1988; Rosenbaum 2007a).
In discussing randomized clinical trials, Peto et al. (1976, page 590-1) wrote: “A
positive result is more likely, and a null result is more informative, if the main comparison
is of only 2 treatments, these being as different as possible. . . . [I]t is a mark of good
trial design that a null result, if it occurs, will be of interest.” This advice is equally
relevant for observational studies, and it is part of the reason that we prefer a conception
in which there is a single treated condition and a single control condition. Despite this, an
investigator may seek some reassurance that the study’s conclusions cannot be undermined
by the possibility of two versions of treatment.
In that spirit, our analysis focuses on the main treatment-control comparison, and
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subordinates the study of versions of treatment or versions of control. In particular, the
main treatment-control comparison is unaffected by the exploration of versions of treatment
— the usual confidence interval for a constant effect is reported — despite controlling the
family-wise error rate in multiple comparisons that explore the possibility of versions of
treatment with different effects. Two confidence intervals are reported, the usual interval
for a constant effect and an interval designed to contain both effects if the two versions
differ. If the effect is constant, then both intervals simultaneously cover that one effect with
probability≥ 1−α, but if there are two versions then the second interval covers both version
effects with probability ≥ 1 − α. The investigator always reports both intervals, valid
under different assumptions. This is an unusual type of simultaneous inference: there is
essentially one question, but there are two sets of assumptions underlying the answer, so one
question is answered twice, as opposed to answering several different questions. There are
multiple assumptions rather than multiple hypotheses. The two intervals together permit
an investigator to report the conventional confidence interval for a constant effect, without
lengthening it for multiple testing, yet the investigator also provides some information
about whether the study’s conclusions depend on the absence of versions of treatment.
The two intervals may possibly disagree, say about whether no effect is plausible, and if
they do disagree then they demonstrate that the assumption about versions of treatment
is playing an important role in the interpretation of the available data. Importantly, the
method does not presume there is a single version of treatment by virtue of failing to reject
the null hypothesis that the two versions are equal. That is, it entertains the possibility
that there are versions of treatment even when the convetional interval assuming a constant
treatment effect is not empty.
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2 Possible versions of control in a study of football and dementia
There is evidence that severe repeated head trauma accelerates the on-set of cognitive
decline or dementia (Graves et al. 1990, Mortimer et al. 1991), with specific concern about
the risks faced by professional football players and boxers (McKee et al. 2009, Lehman et
al. 2012). It is unclear whether there is also increased risk from playing football on a team
in high school, but there have been several recommendations against tackle football in high
school (Bachynski 2016, Miles and Prasad 2016). Does high school football accelerate the
on-set of cognitive decline?
A recent investigation used data from the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study, comparing
cognition and mental health measured at age 65 and 72, recorded in 2005 and 2011, of men
who played football on a high school team in the mid 1950’s to male controls of similar
age who did not play football (Deshpande et al. 2017). Following the practice in clinical
trials, and as is recommended for observational studies by Rubin (2007), the design and
protocol for this study were published on-line after matching was completed but before
outcomes were examined (Deshpande et al. 2016, arXiv preprint arXiv:1607.01756). The
small number of people who engaged in sports other than football with high incidences of
head trauma such as soccer, hockey, and wrestling were excluded from both the football
and control groups. One outcome was the 0-10 score on a ten item delayed word recall
(DWR) test at ages 65 and 72. The delayed word recall test was designed as an inexpensive
measure of memory loss associated with dementia; see Knopman and Ryberg (1989). In
this test, a person is asked to remember a list of words that is then read to the person.
Attention then shifts to another activity, and after a delay, the person is asked to recall as
many words from the list as possible. The DWR score is the number of words remembered.
On average, in the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study, performance on the delayed word recall
test declined by half a word from age 65 to age 72. It is useful to keep that half-word,
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7-year decline in mind when thinking about the magnitude of the effect of playing football.
A comparison of football players to all controls is natural, and might be conducted
without second thought. Among the controls, however, some played a non-collision sport
like baseball or track while others played no sports at all. An investigator might reasonably
seek reassurance that this natural comparison has not oversimplified these two version of
“not playing football.” At the same time, the investigator does not want to sacrifice power
to detect a constant treatment effect in the main comparison en route to obtaining this
reassurance by subdividing the data into many slivers of reduced sample size and correcting
for multiple comparisons. The method we propose achieves both of these objectives.
Our question concerns the effects of high school football. It is important to distinguish
this question from questions about the effects of severe head trauma in general. It is at least
conceivable that high school football is comparatively harmless, while severe head trauma
is not, simply because severe head trauma is not common in high school football, and
the benefits of exercise for all football players offset the harm of severe but rare trauma.
Conversely, severe head trauma from automotive or other accidents may be difficult to
prevent, but if high school football had grave consequences, then it could simply be banned,
in the same way that most high schools do not have boxing teams. We ask about the
effects of playing football in high school on subsequent cognitive function.
The Wisconsin Longitudinal Study describes a specific piece of the US over a specific
period of time, and caution is advised about extrapolating its conclusions to other times
and places. High School football may have changed since the 1950’s, and the demographic
composition of Wisconsin in the 1950’s is not the demographic composition of the US. The
Wisconsin Longitudinal Study is primarily a sequence of surveys, and it is impossible to
use it to investigate questions not asked in those surveys. For instance, we cannot identify
high school students who went on to play professional football, but we suspect they were
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few in number. Because many young people play high school football, the safety of high
school football is an important question apart from the safety of professional football.
3 Full matching of football players and controls
We matched the 591 male football players to all 1,290 male controls who did not play
football and did not play a contact sport. The match controlled for several factors that
may affect later-life cognition, including the student’s IQ score in high school, their high
school rank-in-class recorded as a percent, planned years of future education, as well as
binary indicators of whether teachers rated him as an exceptional student, and whether
his teachers and parents encouraged him to pursue a college education. We also accounted
for aspects of family background like parental income and education.
The match was a “full match,” meaning that a matched set could contain one football
player and one or more controls, or else one control and one or more football players. A full
match is the form of an optimal stratification in the sense that people in the same stratum
are as similar as possible subject to the requirement that every stratum contain at least
one treated subject and one control; see Rosenbaum (1991). Although the proof of this
claim requires some attention to detail, the key idea is simple: if a matched set contained
two treated subjects and two controls, it could be subdivided into two matched sets that
are at least as close on covariates and are typically closer. See Hansen and Klopfer (2006)
for an algorithm for optimal full matching, Hansen (2007) for software, and Hansen (2004)
and Stuart and Green (2008) for applications. The match was constructed using Hansen’s
optmatch package in R with the ratio of controls to treated units constrained between 1:6
and 6:1 to avoid excessively large matched sets.
In a full match, there are I matched sets, i = 1, . . . , I and ni individuals, j = 1, . . . , ni,
in set i. If individual ij played on a football team in high school, write Zij = 1; otherwise,
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write Zij = 0. The number of football players in set i is mi =
∑ni
j=1 Zij , the total number
of individuals is N =
∑I
i=1 ni, and the total number of football players is M =
∑I
i=1mi.
In a full match, min (mi, ni −mi) = 1 for every i.
To explore versions of treatment, we constructed three matched samples. Each sample
used all M = 591 football players. The first matched sample used all controls, that is, every
male who played neither football nor another contact sport. The second matched sample
used only controls who did not play any sport. The third matched sample used controls
who played a non-collision sport, such as baseball. In each match, controls and football
players belong to at most one matched set. Table 1 describes the structure of the three
matched samples, giving the frequency of sets of size (mi, ni −mi), as well as the number
of sets, I, the number of individuals, N , and the number of football players, M . Obviously,
the samples overlap extensively, because they all use all M = 591 football players and no
controls were discarded in forming the optimal full matchings; however, the three matches
differ in structure, partly because there were only N −M = 975− 591 = 384 controls who
played a non-collision sport in the third match. In all three matches, adequate covariate
balance was achieved with nearly all standardized differences in baseline covariates between
football players and controls less than 0.2. Details of very similar matches can be found in
Deshpande et al. (2017).
Table 1: Distribution of matched set sizes, (mi, ni − mi), in three full matches. A 2-1
set contains two treated individuals and one control, while a 1-2 set contains one treated
individual and two controls. There are I matched sets, containing a total of N individuals,
and each match includes all M = 591 football players.
.
Comparison (Treated Count)-(Control-Count) Totals
3-1 2-1 1-1 1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5 1-6 I N M
Football vs. Control 0 0 401 32 26 14 17 101 591 1881 591
Football vs. No sport 70 6 240 29 15 10 3 72 445 1497 591
Football vs. Other sport 90 43 227 3 2 3 0 0 368 975 591
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In studying the effects of a treatment — here, high school football — it is typically in-
appropriate to adjust for events subsequent to the start of treatment, as this may introduce
bias even where none existed prior to adjustments, because part of the treatment effect
may be removed (Rosenbaum 1984). However, there are certain adult health outcomes
that may be different between football players and controls due to disparities in unmea-
sured baseline health characteristics rather than an effect of playing football. This may
threaten the validity of our study if these baseline health characteristics also play a role
in later-life cognitive health. Comparing these health outcomes may can be used, at least
partially, to assess the comparability of the baseline health of the comparison groups. We
checked on the health status of football players and matched controls at age 65 using the
Mantel-Haenszel procedure, failing to find a difference significant at the 0.05 level for “ever
had high blood pressure,” “ever had diabetes,” and “ever had heart problems”. Football
players were more likely to report that they had “ever had a stroke,” with a P -value of 0.03,
and a 95% confidence interval for the odds ratio of [1.09, 3.21]. Extensive comparisons of
this kind are reported in Deshpande et al. (2017).
4 Review of randomization inference without versions of treatment
If there were a single version of treatment or control, then individual ij would have two
potential delayed word recall scores, Yij(1) if he played football and Yij(0) if he did not,
where we observe only one of these, namely Yij = Zij Yij(1)+(1− Zij) Yij(0), and the effect
caused by playing football, namely δij = Yij(1)−Yij(0), is not observed for any individual;
see Neyman (1923) and Rubin (1974). Fisher’s (1935) sharp null hypothesis of no effect
says H0 : Yij(1) = Yij(0), i = 1, . . . , I, j = 1, . . . , ni, which we henceforth abbreviate as
H0 : Yij(1) = Yij(0), ∀i, j or as H0 : δij = 0, ∀i, j. The treatment has an additive constant
effect if there exists some constant τ such that δij = Yij(1)−rCij = τ , ∀i, j. The hypothesis
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Hτ0 specifies a particular numerical value τ0 for τ and asserts Hτ0 : δij = τ0, ∀i, j, and it is
manifested in the observable distribution of Yij by a within-set shift in the distribution of
Yij by τ0. If Hτ0 were true, then Yij − τ0 Zij = Yij(0) would satisfy Fisher’s hypothesis of
no effect, H0, and it is commonplace to test Hτ0 by replacing Yij by Yij−τ0 Zij and testing
H0.
Until §8, we restrict attention to random assignment of treatments within matched
sets; however, §8 considers sensitivity of inferences to departures from this assumption.
Of course, people do not decide to play football at random, so §8 is closer to reality than
random assignment. Fisher (1935), Pitman and Welch (1937) used the randomization
distribution of the mean difference to test Fisher’s H0, and we follow this approach with
the short-tailed delayed word recall scores (DWR), only briefly comparing the mean to a
robust M -statistic. The mean is one M -statistic, but not a robust one. Because the
matched sets are of unequal sizes, (m i, ni −mi), we compute the treated-minus-control
mean difference in DWR scores within each set i and combine them with efficient weights
based on the matched set sizes; see Rosenbaum (2007b, §4.1) for discussion of these weights,
which are implemented in the senfm function of the sensitivityfull package in R with
option trim=Inf.
As is always true, a 1− α confidence interval Ic for τ is formed by inverting a level-α
test, so Ic is the shortest interval of values of τ0 not rejected by the test; see Lehmann and
Romano (2005, §3) for general discussion. Typically, a two-sided confidence interval is the
intersection of two one-sided 1− α/2 confidence intervals; see Shaffer (1974).
Ignoring versions of treatment, using the first match in Table 1, and assuming that
treatments are randomly assigned within matched sets, we obtain a randomization-based
95% confidence interval of [−0.308, 0.099] for τ , that is, for a constant effect of playing
football on the number of words remembered in the delayed word recall test. Because
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this confidence interval includes zero, the hypothesis of no effect is not rejected at the 0.05
level. Because this confidence interval excludes all τ with |τ | ≥ 1/3, constant effects of
±1/3 word remembered have been rejected as too large. It is important that “no effect”
is plausible, but equally important that large effects, positive or negative, are implausible
values for a constant effect, τ . Our goal is to avoid lengthening this interval for τ as
we explore possible versions of the control, while controlling the family-wise error rate at
α, conventionally α = 0.05. This simultaneous inference is possible if the exploration of
versions of treatment takes a specific form.
Incidentally, had we built the confidence interval for τ using the default M -estimate in
the senfm function, rather than the mean with option trim=Inf, then the 95% random-
ization interval for τ would have been [−0.315, 0.096]. The default M -estimate in senfm
corresponds to Huber’s ψ-function, i.e., ψ(y) = y for |y| ≤ 1 and ψ(y) = sign(y) for |y| > 1.
Generally, use of robust procedures is advisable, but we do not do so in this example to
simplify its presentation, as the robust procedures give similar answers in this short-tailed
example.
5 Inference with versions of treatment
5.1 Structure of the problem
With two versions of control, say “playing no sport” and “playing a non-collision sport”
like baseball, each person has two potential control responses, Yij(0, a) and Yij(0, b), and
hence two treatment effects, δaij = Yij(1)−Yij(0, a) and δbij = Yij(1)−Yij(0, b). If Yij(0, a) =
Yij(0, b), ∀i, j, then the two versions of control yield the same effects, δaij = δbij , and so the
versions need not be distinguished. This notation for potential outcome under versions
of control follows Vanderweele and Hernan (2013) where potential outcomes are fixed by
both treatment and version. If there are versions, the implied randomization distribution
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will have three arms when matched sets include both versions of control, which might
complicate inference. However, we only use the matching with sets including both versions
of control to conduct inference under the assumption that the versions are irrelevant, and
thus the three arm randomization distribution collapses to the simpler two arm design.
Consider the two null hypotheses about additive effects for the two versions of control,
Haτ0 : δ
a
ij = τ0, ∀i, j and H
b
τ0 : δ
b
ij = τ0, ∀i, j. Here, Haτ0 might be true when H
b
τ0 is false,
or conversely. Define Hτ0 to be the hypothesis that both H
a
τ0 and H
b
τ0 are true, that is,
Hτ0 : δ
a
ij = δ
b
ij = τ0, ∀i, j, so the two versions of control yield the same effect τ0 and need
not be distinguished. By the definition of Hτ0 , if either H
a
τ0 or H
b
τ0 is false, then Hτ0 is
false; that is, if there are two versions of treatment or control with different effects, then
there is not a constant effect.
It is straightforward to test Haτ0 or H
b
τ0 using the methods in §4 simply by restricting
attention to controls of one type or the other. These tests will be based on a smaller
sample size than the test in §4 because not all of the controls are used. Moreover, if
Hτ0 , H
a
τ0 and H
b
τ0 are each tested at level α, then the chance of at least one false rejection
would typically exceed α unless something is done to control the family-wise error rate.
Understandably, an investigator would like to avoid weakening the inference about Hτ0 by
virtue of considering Haτ0 and H
b
τ0 , and the question is how to achieve the investigator’s
goals.
Suppose there are two versions of a constant additive treatment effect, δaij = τ
a and
δbij = τ
b for every i, j. Let τmin = min
(
τa, τ b
)
and τmax = max
(
τa, τ b
)
. If τa = τ b = τ ,
then τmin = τ and τmax = τ , so the versions do not matter. Our approach in §5.2 is to
build two confidence intervals, one interval for τ and another interval designed to contain
[τmin, τmax]. If there is no need to consider versions of treatment or control because
Yij(0, a) = Yij(0, b), implying that τ
a = τ b = τ , then with probability at least 1− α, both
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intervals simultaneously cover the true τ . If τa 6= τ b , then Hτ0 is false for every τ0, but
with probability at least 1−α the second interval covers the interval [τmin, τmax]. Moreover,
the first interval for τ is the interval reported in §4 ignoring versions of treatment, so the
investigator has ensured that under either the assumption of a constant treatment effect or
the assumption of versions, the two intervals he reports control the family-wise error rate
at α, while paying no additional price in power to detect a constant effect for consideration
of versions of treatment. The inference is simultaneous in that the two intervals provide
the correct coverage for τ under the assumption of a constant effect and also the correct
coverage for τa and τ b under the presence of versions.
5.2 Inference when there may or may not be two versions of treatment
The theory in this section is derived for one-sided intervals but, as we will see shortly, is
easily extended to the two-sided 1−α intervals described in the previous section. There is
a valid, one-sided P -value, say P aτ0 , testing H
a
τ0 against τ
a > τ0, so that Pr
(
P aτ0 ≤ α
) ≤ α if
Haτ0 is true. In parallel, there is a valid one-sided P -value P
b
τ0 , testing H
b
τ0 against τ
b > τ0,
and a valid one-sided P -value, Pτ0 , testing Hτ0 against τ > τ0. With a slight abuse of
notation, write the probability that a random interval I contains a fixed real number τ as
Pr (I ⊇ τ). Under the assumption, perhaps incorrect, that the there is a single version of
the treatment, τa = τ b = τ , let I−c be the usual one-sided 1 − α confidence interval for τ
formed by inverting the test of Hτ0 , so I−c is the smallest set of the form [τ˜ , ∞) containing
{τ0 : Pτ0 > α}. If there are no versions of treatment, so τa = τ b = τ for some τ , then
Pr (I−c ⊇ τ) ≥ α by the familiar duality of tests and confidence intervals; see Lehmann and
Romano (2005, Chapter 3). The investigator would like to report this standard interval
I−c for a constant effect, without lengthening it for multiple testing, yet would like to also
say something about the possibility that there are versions of treatment with τa 6= τ b. Of
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course, if there are versions of treatment with τa 6= τ b then Hτ0 is false for every τ0 and
there is no true value of τ for I−c to contain or omit.
The smallest set of the form [τ˜ , ∞) containing {τ0 : Pτ0 > α or P aτ0 > α or P bτ0 > α}
will be denoted I−v . Of course, I−v ⊇ I−c .
The investigator does not know whether or not there are two versions of treatment,
whether or not τa = τ b. The investigator would like to make two inferences appropriate
for the two situations, τa = τ b or τa 6= τ b. The investigator would like to make an
inference appropriate to this state of ignorance. The investigator says “I do not know
whether there are two versions of treatment, whether or not τa = τ b; however, (i) if there
are not versions of treatment so that τa = τ b = τ , then I−c ⊇ τ , and (ii) whether or not
there are two versions of treatment, even if τa 6= τ b, then I−v ⊇ τmin; moreover, this method
produces two true hypothetical statements with probability at least 1−α.” Statement (ii)
cost nothing, in the sense that I−c is the usual one-sided confidence interval for τ assuming
there are not versions of treatment, yet both statements hold jointly without multiplicity
correction. This is established in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (i) If there is only one version of treatment, τa = τ b = τ , then Pr (I−v ⊇ I−c ⊇ τ) ≥
1− α. (ii) In any event, whether there are two versions of treatment, τa 6= τ b, or only a
single version, τa = τ b = τ , we have Pr (I−v ⊇ τmin) ≥ 1− α.
Proof. By the definitions of I−v and I−c , we have I−v ⊇ I−c . Then (i) follows because, if
there are not versions of treatment, τa = τ b = τ , then I−c is a 1−α confidence interval for
τ and Pr (I−v ⊇ I−c ⊇ τ) ≥ 1−α. If there are not versions of treatment, τa = τ b = τ , then
τmin = τ , so Pr (I−v ⊇ τmin) ≥ 1−α, as required for (ii). So suppose there are two versions
of treatment. If τa = τmin < τmax = τ
b, then τmin /∈ I−v implies P aτa ≤ α which occurs with
probability at most α. If τ b = τmin < τmax = τ
a, then τmin /∈ I−v implies P bτb ≤ α which
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occurs with probability at most α. So in all three cases, τa = τ b or τa < τ b or τa > τ b,
we have Pr (I−v ⊇ τmin) ≥ 1− α, proving (ii).
By a parallel argument, we obtain analogous 1 − α upper intervals, I+c and I+v , of
the form (−∞, τ˜) for τ if τa = τ b = τ or without restrictions for τmax. Taking the
intersections, Ic = I−c ∩ I+c and Iv = I−v ∩ I+v , of two one-sided 1 − α/2 intervals yields
analogous two-sided 1 − α intervals for τ if τa = τ b = τ or without restrictions for the
interval [τmin, τmax]. In most cases, Iv can be constructed by taking the union of Ic and
the two two-sided intervals constructed from the matched sets using each separate version
of control. When this union is disjoint, Iv is the shortest interval that contains all three
intervals.
In case (ii), the proof above that Pr (Iv ⊇ τmin) ≥ 1−α is similar to, but not quite iden-
tical to, results in Lehmann (1952), Berger (1982) and Laska and Meisner (1989). These
authors proposed tests that would invert to yield as a confidence interval the shortest inter-
val I∗ containing
{
τ0 : P
a
τ0 > α or P
b
τ0 > α
}
, whereas Iv is the shortest interval containing{
τ0 : Pτ0 > α or P
a
τ0 > α or P
b
τ0 > α
}
, thereby ensuring Iv ⊇ Ic. Of course, Iv ⊇ I∗, but
unlike I∗, our method ensures that Iv and Ic both simultaneously cover τa = τ b = τ at
rate 1 − α when there is actually only a single version of treatment. Because Ic is built
using all of the data and under stronger assumptions, it is unlikely that I∗ will be much
shorter than Iv; however, this logical possibility is the price for reporting the usual interval,
Ic, without multiplicity correction.
Why not report a single robust interval like I∗ instead of two intervals, Ic and Iv, that
have slightly more nuanced coverage properties? A simple example may help illustrate the
advantage of reporting Ic and Iv over I∗. Suppose that I∗ and Iv both contain zero but Ic
does not. If we choose to report I∗ then we have little additional information to determine
why I∗ contains zero – is Fisher’s sharp null true or is the smaller of the the two versions of
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effect very close to zero? Or are there versions of the effect with different signs? However,
if we report Ic and Iv we have evidence against Fisher’s sharp null, narrowing the plausible
explanations for why zero is contained in Iv, which we’ve noted will tend to be similar to
I∗.
5.3 Interval estimates in the football study
The upper third of Figure 1, marked Γ = 1, shows 95% intervals for the football study,
assuming that treatments are randomly assigned within matched sets. First, there are
the three conventional intervals for τ , τa, and τ b, corresponding to the three comparisons
in Table 1. Each of these intervals is a 95% confidence interval on its own, but each
one runs a 5% chance of error, so the chance that at least one interval fails to cover its
corresponding parameter is greater than 5%. Obviously, we could make the three intervals
longer, say using the Bonferroni inequality, so that the simultaneous coverage is 95%, but
many investigators would find this unattractive because it would reduce the power of the
conventional, primary analysis focused on τ that uses all of the controls; that is, it would
make the first interval longer.
In contrast, the intervals Ic and Iv in Figure 1 have simultaneous coverage of 95% in
the sense of Proposition 1. Notably, Ic = [−0.308, 0.099] is the interval for τ from §4,
so consideration of Iv has not reduced power to detect a constant effect. The versions
Iv = [−0.357, 0.219] is slightly longer than Ic, but both intervals are compatible with
no effect and both intervals are quite incompatible with an effect of half a word, ±0.5.
For comparison, recall from §2 that average performance on the delayed word recall test
declined by half a word from age 65 to age 72. In Figure 1, the 95% interval for “all
controls” equals Ic, while Iv is the union of the three intervals for “all controls”, “controls
who played no sport”, and “controls who played another sport”.
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Figure 1: Comparison of interval estimates for the e↵ect of high school football
on the delayed word recall score. The intervals for   = 1 assume that there is
no bias from unmeasured covariates, while   > 1 permits unmeasured biases of
unknown form but limited magnitude. The top three intervals for “all controls”,
“no sport”, and “other sport”, are conventional confidence intervals lacking
simultaneous coverage. The bottom two intervals are Ic and Iv. Notice that
the “all controls” interval equals Ic and the union of the first three intervals
equals Iv.
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6 Comparison to conventional approaches to multiple versions: F-tests and
Bonferroni correction
The method described in §5.2 makes an important trade-off: it prioritizes the primary
comparison against all controls under the assumption of a constant treatment effect, al-
lowing us to report the corresponding confidence interval with no correction, in exchange
for the ability to distinguish between versions if they do, in fact, exists. In other words,
our method emphasizes detection of non-zero, constant treatment effects over detecting
different versions of the effect. Conventional approaches to multiple comparisons, are of-
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ten less focused and are designed to detect a broader range of departures from the null.
For example, a simple Bonferroni correction places the primary comparison and the two
versioned comparisons on equal footing. If the investigator does not suspect a priori that a
particular alternative hypothesis is most likely, he may conduct an omnibus F-test, whose
power is distributed over a broad range of alternative hypotheses.
The researcher’s scientifc aim should determine which method for multiple comparisons
is most appropriate. With this guidance in mind, we compare our method to the omnibus
F-test and Bonferroni corrected intervals.
The omnibus F-test
In exploratory analyses, the F-test can be a useful “prelude to subsequent examinations
of unplanned contrasts” (Steiger, 2004). However, in many studies, the researcher will have
a particular contrast in mind. Several authors have argued that the omnibus hypothesis in
ANOVA studies be replaced with hypotheses that focus on a substantive research question,
often involving just a single contrast (Rosenthal et al., 2000; Steiger, 2004). In the football
study, we suspect a priori that versions are not terribly consequential and proceed first with
our primary investigation of whether playing high school football accelerates the onset of
cognitive decline. The hypotheses about versions are secondary to our main inquiry and
are treated as such in our method.
The F-test does not lend itself to effect size estimates, but we can compare it to our
method by evaluating it’s power to reject Fisher’s sharp null hypothesis and the probabil-
ity that Ic excludes τ = 0 under a variety of alternative hypotheses with vary degrees of
“versioning.” If the primary goal of the study is less directed and detecting any departure
from the null of no effect is of interest and the researcher suspects that versions may play
an important role, the F-test may be more suitable. However, in a simulation study de-
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scribed in the Appendix, we find that when the versions differ by less than ∼ 30− 40% in
magnitude and have the same sign our method has better power to reject Fisher’s sharp
null than the F-test. Being an omnibus test, the F-test power is much less sensitive to the
specific pattern of alternative hypothesis.
Bonferroni corrected intervals
In Figure 2, we compare the intervals returned by our version method to the three
intervals returned by a Bonferroni correction (BC) to the comparison of the football players
against all controls and each version of control. In the top panel, the BC interval using
all controls is 22% longer than Ic. In the bottom panel, Iv is only 3% longer than the
BC interval using only “no sport” controls and 15% shorter than the BC interval using
“other sport” controls. In this particular case, where versions appear to be relatively
innocuous, the cost of lengthening the primary interval is significant for what apears to
be little if any gain from investigating each version separately. Bonferroni correction may
be more appropriate when the investigator suspects the versions are important, and he
may even replace the primary comparison with a comparison of the two versions of control
themselves. However, if the versions are only modestly different, for which our method is
designed, it is unlikely that Bonferroni would have sufficient power to detect such modest
differences in the versions of control.
7 Versions, effect modification, and insufficient overlap
In the study of the effects of playing high school football on cognitive decline, the two
versions of control and the football players have significant overlap in observed covariates.
An anonymous reviewer suggested the following situation. Suppose that athletes who did
not play football and non-athletes who did not play football differ noticeably on observed
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Figure 2: Comparison of Ic (top panel, dark line) and Iv (bottom panel, dark line) to
Bonferroni corrected (BC) intervals comparing football players vs. “all controls” (top
panel, light line), vs. “no sport” controls (bottom panel, top-most light line), and vs.
“other sport” controls (bottom panel, bottom-most light line). Notice that Iv is very
similar in length to the BC interval using “no sport” controls and is noticeably shorter
than the BC interval using “other sport” controls.
covariates such that a different set of football players were matched in the matchings using
the different versions of control. If the treatment is heterogeneous, say it is modified by
some observed covariate that differs between the two versions of control, does “this mean
there are two versions of treatment or that there are two groups of individuals that are
involved in the two comparisons.” In this setting, the potential for treatment heterogeneity
is aliased with the potential for versions of the treatment effect. But does this matter? The
logic of §5.2 is agnostic to why there may be different treatment effects between versions.
Thus, Iv can be interpreted as assessing how robust our primary analysis is to the existence
of versions of treatment or to the existence of effect heterogeneity between the two groups
defined by “versions” of control.
20
8 Sensitivity to departures from random assignment
So far, we have drawn inferences under the assumption that treatments are randomly
assigned within matched sets. In an observational study, this assumption lacks support and
is typically doubtful if not implausible. We examine sensitivity to bias from nonrandom
assignment by assuming that two individuals with the same observed covariates may differ
in their odds of treatment by at most a factor of Γ ≥ 1 due to differences in unobserved
covariates; see Rosenbaum (2007b; 2017, §9). This yields hypothesis tests that falsely reject
a true null hypothesis with probability at most α when the bias in treatment assignment
is at most Γ. Then Γ is varied to display the magnitude of bias that would need to
be present to alter the conclusions of a study. How much bias, measured by Γ, would
need to be present to lead us to fail to reject the null hypothesis of no effect of football
when, in fact, football causes substantial harm? In the current example where there is no
evidence of a harmful effect of football, we may ask a parallel question that is related to
equivalence testing: how much bias would need to be present to mask a substantial true
effect of football on memory? For example, an increase or decrease of a DWR score by at
least one word.
Aids to interpreting values of Γ are discussed by Rosenbaum and Silber (2009) and
Hsu and Small (2013). In particular, in a matched pair with ni = 2, the value Γ = 1.25
corresponds with an unobserved covariate that doubles the odds of playing football and
doubles the odds of a worse memory score, while Γ = 1.5 corresponds with an unobserved
covariate that doubles the odds of playing football and quadruples the odds of a worse
memory score; see Rosenbaum and Silber (2009) and Rosenbaum (2017, §9). Proposition
1 applies to the intervals obtained from upper bounds on P -values from sensitivity analyses,
providing the bias in treatment assignment is at most Γ.
Figure 1 shows the expansion of Ic and Iv as Γ increases from Γ = 1 for randomization
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inferences to Γ = 1.25 and Γ = 1.5. For Γ = 1.25, the intervals are Ic = [−0.534, 0.328]
and Iv = [−0.574, 0.464]. For Γ = 1.5, the intervals are Ic = [−0.716, 0.517] and
Iv = [−0.771, 0.666]. A bias of Γ = 1.5 together with two versions of not playing football
would be insufficient to mask an effect of one word on the memory test, ±1. At Γ = 2,
not shown in Figure 1, effects of ±1 word start to be included in the confidence intervals,
with Ic = [−0.997, 0.817] and Iv = [−1.082, 0.986]. A bias of Γ = 2 corresponds with
an unobserved covariate that triples the odds of playing football and increases the odds of
worse memory performance by five-fold.
In brief, there is no sign of an effect of high school football on memory scores. Could the
absence of any sign of an effect reflect a substantial effect and bias in who plays football?
To mask a true effect of ±1 word, an unobserved bias would have to be moderately large,
Γ = 2. Even allowing for both moderate confounding due to unmeasured covariates
and versions of treatment, large effects of high school football on memory scores are not
consistent with the data.
9 Discussion: Simultaneous inference about one question under different as-
sumptions
Investigators sometimes candidly report two or more statistical analyses valid under differ-
ent assumptions. In the process, they often lose the several advantages of a single, simple,
primary analysis, that is, a single analysis with high power against a non-zero constant
effect because it uses everyone and avoids needed corrections for multiple testing when
several statistical tests are performed. With less candor, investigators sometimes perform
several analyses and report some but not all analyses, a perhaps common practice that no
one would publicly advocate.
Versions of treatment arise in observational studies when treatment or control condi-
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tions found in available data may not be uniform, as they would be in a tightly controlled
experiment. The investigator would like follow the practice of clinical trials and report a
single, primary analysis using everyone without multiplicity correction. Nonetheless, the
investigator would like to speak to the possibility that there are versions of treatment or
control conditions. The proposed method always reports two interval estimates. The
first, shorter interval, Ic, is precisely the interval that would be reported in a single pri-
mary analysis without versions of treatment. The second longer interval, Iv, attempts
to cover both treatment effects if there are two versions of treatment or two versions of
control. If there is, in fact, only a single treatment effect, the same for both versions, then
the probability that both Ic and Iv simultaneously cover that one effect is the stated rate
of 1−α. If there are, in fact, two treatment effects that differ with the two versions, then
the second interval, Iv, covers both effects with the stated rate of 1−α. In that sense, the
added information provided by reporting two intervals, Ic and Iv, is free: the interval Ic is
clarified but not lengthened by examining Iv. Although Iv is always somewhat longer than
Ic, in the football example it is only slightly longer, thereby suggesting that the primary
analysis is not greatly distorted by the two versions of the control condition.
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Appendix: Simulation comparing the power of the omnibus F-test to Ic
In this appendix, we compare the power of the omnibus F-test to the power of our version
method to detect departures from Fisher’s sharp null hypothesis under varying degrees
of “versioning.” The results can be found in Table 2. When the degree of versioning is
modest, the version method is more powerful than the F-test.
Version τ b = 0.25 τ b = 0.4
P (Ic 6⊇ 0) P (F > cα) P (Ic 6⊇ 0) P (F > cα)
τa = τ b 0.61 0.49 0.94 0.91
τa = 0.95× τ b 0.58 0.47 0.93 0.88
τa = 0.9× τ b 0.56 0.47 0.93 0.89
τa = 0.75× τ b 0.51 0.43 0.89 0.85
τa = 0.65× τ b 0.44 0.42 0.83 0.84
τa = 0.6× τ b 0.44 0.44 0.83 0.86
τa = 0.5× τ b 0.37 0.41 0.75 0.84
τa = 0.25× τ b 0.27 0.55 0.58 0.95
Table 2: Comparison of the power of the version method (columns 2 and 4) and the power
of the F-test (columns 3 and 5) to reject Fisher’s sharp null hypothesis under alternative
hypotheses with varying degrees of “versioning.” Significance level of the tests are α = 0.05
Simulation settings
Let there be I = 100 matched sets, with mi = 1 treated and ni −mi = 4 controls in
each set. The design is balanced over versions, i.e., there are two controls of each version
in each matched set. In each set we generate outcomes as follows: Yij = τ +Xi + ij if the
j-th subject in set i receives treatment, Yij = Xi + ij if the j-th subject receives control
version b, and Yij = δ + Xi + ij if the j-th subject receives control version. We let the
individual and matched-set level terms, ij and Xi, be distributed as independent standard
normals. Finally, let τ b = τ and τa = τ − δ. If there are no versions, then δ = 0. When
conducting the F-test of the null of no treatment effect, we model Xi as a linear effect.
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